Comprometido, mas não casado, com solteiros: Explodindo o critério de compromisso ontológico de Quine

In Vinícius Felipe Posselt, Taís Regina Chiodelli, Claiton Costa, Eduardo Alves, Kelvin Amorim de Melo, Leonardo Teixeira Pereira & Messias Miguel Uaissone (eds.), XXIII Semana Acadêmica PPG Filosofia PUCRS. Fundação Fênix. pp. 197-212 (2023)
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Abstract

W. V. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is commonly presented as the slogan: “to be is to be the value of a variable”. More specifically, to be is to be in the domain of values of a bound variable attached to a existential quantifier in the body of a theory. If a sentence of our best available theory quantifies over bachelors, so we conclude that, according to it, there are bachelors. Simplicity and the use of logical apparatus for determining this criterion are responsible for many philosophers to adhere to this standpoint within analytical metaphysics. I will argue that despite this strong influence of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment in many debates, we find at least three interlinked problems in its original formulation: (1) The criterion depends of a clear definition of theory for the determination of the quantifications counting as entailers of ontological commitments. However, Quine does not present such clear concept of what would be a theory and of how to formalize it. Quine develops this notion under just the metaphor of the knowledge fabric, in which we have a group of sentences, which does not suffice for the required account of ontological commitment. (2) There are distinct possibilities of quantifying over given sentences, which leaves room for different ontological commitments associated with the same statement. In that sense, someone could argue that the Quinean solution would be to endorse just the first order predicate logic. Nonetheless, the Quinean should explain why we ought to be restricted to this logic. (3) The previous problems lead to a possible explosion of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, making it trivial, because it permits the quantification over any supposed entities and, hence, that anything can exist. Thus, I will discuss Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in the light of the abovementioned problems, showing that, unless the Quinean presents a more specific definition of theory beyond just a group of sentences, he leads to an explosion of commitments with different entities. I will conclude that, if you understand ‘theory’ as Alonzo Church’s concept of ‘formalized language’, this knot can be undone. However, Church’s concept is much more akin to Carnap’s linguistic framework than to a notion of knowledge fabric “without borders” as the one proposed by Quine.

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Deiver Melo
University of Campinas

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