Emotions and their Relation to Cognition: Reflections about Anthony Kenny's Objections against Feeling Theories

Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 7 (8) (2018)
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Abstract

This paper takes as its focus William James' (1884, 1890) and Anthony Kenny's (1963) proposals and strives to show that their point of view is better understood when interpreted as proposals for investigations with different objectives and placed at different angles of complex research revolving around emotions. As James and Kenny are conceived, furthermore, as paradigmatic authors of, respectively, the none–cognitive and cognitive perspectives, this approach to the interpretation of their positions will create new access routes for a dialogue between the traditions and will establish new grounds for a reconciliation between these conceptions in a more ample framework.

Author's Profile

Andrea Florencia Melamed
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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