Enactivismo y valoración. Cómo superar la querella entre teorías somáticas y cognitivas de las emociones
Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 84:163-181 (2021)
AbstractIn this work my aim to show that it is possible to address emotions by paying special attention to the sources of conflict between cogni-tivists and non-cognitivists but by questioning the framework within which they have been erected. The path I propose aims to establish a new way of approaching the antagonism between somatic and cognitive approaches to emotions, which has had so much influence on the investigation of emo-tions, in light of one of the greatest problems that the somatic approach faces: the problem of varia-bility. I will show how certain concepts acquire new meaning in the post-cognitivist framework and allow new (and better) answers to old problems regarding emotional phenomena.
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