In Defense of a Realization Formulation of Physicalism

Topoi 37 (3):483-493 (2018)
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Abstract

In earlier work, I proposed and defended a formulation of physicalism that was distinctive in appealing to a carefully-defined relation of physical realization. Various philosophers (Robert Francescotti, Daniel Stoljar, Carl Gillett, and Susan Schneider) have since presented challenges to this formulation. In the present paper, I aim to show that these challenges can be overcome.

Author's Profile

Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

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