Normatividad y descripción: aspectos problemáticos de la filosofía de la ciencia en la segunda mitad del siglo XX

A Parte Rei 73:1-9 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The purpose of this paper is to discuss some consecuences of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy on the respect of the normative and descriptive dimensions of the philosophy of science. By contradistinction to the normativism of neopositivist and popperian traditions, kuhnian’s premiss that the philosophy of science must reflect the real history of scientific practice, entails that the function of the discipline is to describe the historical developement of science, and not to impose a model of how science must be. From Steve Fuller point of view, Kuhn has restricted the function of philosophy of science to the clarification of the conceptual bases of the dominant paradigms, and its defense from external attacks. Thus, the explanation of the historical developement of science it ends officiating as a conceptual legitimation of the decisions of the scientific elites. By counterpart, the premise that underlies Popper’s normativism is that science is a social product, whose implications trascend the internal structure of scientific communities. This justifies that the philosophy of science could put the scientific actions into question, even more when they are not free from the interference of extrascientific agents. The same way, if scientific commnnities are not free to autodeterminate themselves, as their aims involve extrascientific actors and interests, the philosophy of science should not be limited to describe and explain the historical developement of science, but it should reenable the consideration of the normative dimension.

Author's Profile

Pablo Melogno
Universidad de la Republica


Added to PP

253 (#54,086)

6 months
38 (#83,413)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?