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Undermining Defeat and Propositional Justification
Argumenta 1 (2):271-280 (2016)
Abstract
I extend the Higher-Order View of Undermining Defeat (HOVUD) defended in Melis (2014) to account for the defeat of propositional justification. In doing so, I clarify the important notion of higher-order commitment, and I make some considerations concerning the defeat of externalist epistemic warrants.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2016-10-17
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397 (#56,731)
6 months
92 (#62,280)
2016-10-17
Downloads
397 (#56,731)
6 months
92 (#62,280)
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