When Are We Self-Deceived?

Humana Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies (20) (2012)
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This article‘s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fleshing out an important member of the proposed set of conditions, I provide a sketch of my view about how selfdeception happens. I then return to the proposed set of jointly sufficient conditions and offer a pair of amendments.

Author's Profile

Alfred Mele
Florida State University


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