Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics

Dissertation, Princeton University (2010)
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This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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References found in this work BETA
The Big Book of Concepts.Murphy, Gregory L.
Doing Without Concepts.Machery, Edouard
The Extended Mind.Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J.

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Tracking Representationalism.Bourget, David & Mendelovici, Angela

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