Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects

In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233 (2018)
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Abstract
Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the contents of intentional states. I argue that we should understand the views in the second way. I also argue that the propositionalism debate is fairly independent from debates over the deep nature of intentionality, and that this has implications for arguments for propositionalism and objectualism from claims about the nature of intentional content. I close with a short discussion of how related points apply to the debate over singular content.
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First archival date: 2018-01-13
Latest version: 4 (2018-03-27)
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