Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
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2012-05-08
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2012-05-08
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1,318 ( #2,462 of 55,851 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
93 ( #6,601 of 55,851 )
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