Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Dretske, Fred I.
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Dretske, Fred
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Millikan, Ruth G.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Tye, Michael
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Citations of this work BETA
Debunking Arguments.Korman, Daniel Z.
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Mendelovici, Angela & Bourget, David
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Korman, Daniel Z.
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2012-05-08
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1,206 ( #2,218 of 49,060 )
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166 ( #2,715 of 49,060 )
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