Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

Angela Mendelovici

Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)

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Abstract

It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them

Keywords

Mental representation Causal theories of mental representation Teleological theories of mental representation Asymmetric dependence Reliable misrepresentation Colors

Categories

Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Color Irrealism in Philosophy of Mind

Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc in Philosophy of Mind

Teleological Accounts of Mental Content in Philosophy of Mind

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ISBN(s)

DOI

10.1007/s11098-012-9966-8

PhilPapers/Archive ID

MENRMA

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First archival date: 2012-05-07
Latest version: 2 (2012-05-09)
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Applied ethics	Epistemology	History of Western Philosophy	Meta-ethics	Metaphysics	Normative ethics
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