Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Dretske, Fred
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Millikan, Ruth G.
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Dretske, Fred
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Horgan, Terence & Tienson, John
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Citations of this work BETA
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Mendelovici, Angela & Bourget, David
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Schellenberg, Susanna
Intentionalism About Moods.Mendelovici, Angela
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2012-05-08
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2012-05-08
Total downloads
834 ( #1,909 of 37,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
78 ( #4,200 of 37,117 )
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