Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
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Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
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First archival date: 2012-05-07
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