Three Reasons for Knowing Other than Knowing Otherwise: A Reply to Alexis Shotwell

PhaenEx 8 (1):267-275 (2013)
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In this article, I raise three potential objections to Alexis Shotwell’s view of “implicit knowledge,” which she presents in her book Knowing Otherwise.
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Archival date: 2013-09-22
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