Disjunction and the Logic of Grounding

Erkenntnis:1-21 (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MERDAT
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-04-06
Latest version: 2 (2020-04-06)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-14

Total views
47 ( #45,285 of 52,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #26,279 of 52,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.