Existence and the Big Bang 8 21 2021

Abstract

We start by asking the question of ‘why there is something rather than nothing’ and change this to the question of ‘what are the weakest assumptions for existence’ Eagle [1]. Then we give a kind of Fragmental Perspectivalism. Within this Fragmentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics (each quantum mechanical system forms a fragment) Merriam [2], it turns out McTaggart’s [3] A-series of time (the A-series is future to the present to the past) has a kind of perspectivalism. We then use McTaggart’s A-series and the B-series (the B-series is earlier times to later times) of time to differentiate between how far in the past the big bang was vs. how much earlier than now the big bang was. In one example model, the former goes infinitely far into the past while the latter stays finitely earlier-than. In this model the number of quantum interactions per unit 4-volume goes up to infinity as the big bang is approached from the present epoch.

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