Einstein's Train in Fragmentalist Presentism

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It is often thought the relativity of simultaneity is inconsistent with presentism. This would be troubling as it conflicts with common sense and—arguably—the empirical data. This note gives a novel fragmentalist-presentist theory that allows for the (non-trivial) relativity of simultaneity. A detailed account of the canonical moving train argument is considered. Alice, standing at the train station, forms her own ontological fragment, in which Bob’s frame of reference, given by the moving train, is modified by the Lorentz transformations. On the other hand, Bob, in the train, forms his own ontological fragment from which Alice’s space and time are modified by the corresponding Lorentz transformations. Each fragment accommodates a unique present moment but does not contain information about the unique present moment of another fragment. This allows for a ‘universal’ present moment that extends throughout space, but only from the perspective of each fragment. The relativity of simultaneity is, as it were, ‘relativised’ to each fragment. This is related to the idea that, roughly speaking, the time of relativity is McTaggart’s (1908) B-series (earlier times to later times) and the time of quantum mechanics is a (fragmentalist) A-series (future/present/past), where these two related series characterize one dimension of time.
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Archival date: 2021-09-21
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