Naming and Free Will

Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (4):475-484 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free will. The authors show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years.

Author Profiles

Fabio Lampert
University of Greifswald
Pedro Merlussi
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro


Added to PP

170 (#62,181)

6 months
59 (#50,024)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?