M-Autonomy

Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime, because while conscious cognition is unfolding, it often cannot be inhibited, suspended, or terminated. The instantiation of a stable first- person perspective as well as of certain necessary conditions of personhood turn out to be rare, graded, and dynamically variable properties of human beings. I argue that individual representational events only become part of a personal-level process by being functionally integrated into a specific form of transparent conscious self-representation, the ‘epistemic agent model’. The EAM may be the true origin of our consciously experienced firstperson perspective
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
METM-5
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-12-03
Latest version: 2 (2015-12-07)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-12-03

Total views
298 ( #17,775 of 55,890 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #34,910 of 55,890 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.