Answerability, Blameworthiness, and History
Philosophia 42 (2):469-486 (2014)
Abstract
This paper focuses on a non-volitional account that has received a good deal of attention recently, Angela Smith's rational relations view. I argue that without historical conditions on blameworthiness for the non-voluntary non-volitionist accounts like Smith’s are (i) vulnerable to manipulation cases and (ii) fail to make sufficient room for the distinction between badness and blameworthiness. Towards the end of the paper I propose conditions aimed to supplement these deficiencies. The conditions that I propose are tailored to suit non-volitional accounts of blameworthiness. Unlike some volitional historical conditions on blameworthiness, the conditions that I propose do not require that the person have exercised voluntary control (e.g., via choices or decisions) over the acquisition of her attitudes or values
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Archival date: 2020-04-12
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2013-11-30
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74 ( #42,894 of 56,012 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #35,208 of 56,012 )
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