Against Passage Illusionism

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (2022)
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Abstract

Temporal dynamists typically hold that it seems to us as though time robustly passes, and that its seeming so is explained by the fact that time does robustly pass. Temporal non-dynamists hold that time does not robustly pass. Some non-dynamists nevertheless hold that it seems as though it does: we have an illusory phenomenal state whose content represents robust passage. Call these phenomenal passage illusionists. Other non-dynamists argue that the phenomenal state in question is veridical and represents something other than robust passage. Call this the veridical passage-less view. This paper argues in favour of the latter view over the former, by arguing that we should reject passage illusionism.

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Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

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