A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation

Synthese 196 (7):2777-2802 (2019)
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Abstract

Many think that sentences about what metaphysically explains what are true iff there exist grounding relations. This suggests that sceptics about grounding should be error theorists about metaphysical explanation. We think there is a better option: a theory of metaphysical explanation which offers truth conditions for claims about what metaphysically explains what that are not couched in terms of grounding relations, but are instead couched in terms of, inter alia, psychological facts. We do not argue that our account is superior to grounding-based accounts. Rather, we offer it to those already ill-disposed towards grounding.

Author Profiles

Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
James Norton
University of Tasmania

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