Bayesian Beauty

Erkenntnis:1-20 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalization and Reflection. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the ‘thirder’ solution satisfies standard rationality principles, vindicating why it is not vulnerable to diachronic Dutch Book arguments. Moreover, the diachronic Dutch Books against the ‘halfer’ solutions fail to undermine the standard arguments for Conditionalization. The main upshot that emerges from my discussion is that the disagreement between different solutions does not challenge the applicability of Bayesian reasoning to centered settings, nor the commitment to Conditionalization, but is instead an instance of the familiar problem of choosing the priors.
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Archival date: 2020-02-18
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2020-02-13

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