Defending Substantivism about Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition

Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):529-556 (2014)
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This paper defends substantivism about disputes in the metaphysics of composition. That is, it defends the view that disputes about the metaphysics of composition are substantial: they are neither merely apparent disputes in which disputants are talking past one another in virtue of disagreeing about the truth conditions for certain sentences; nor are they disputes in which there is no fact of the matter in the world in virtue of which one party to the dis-pute is right and the other(s) wrong.
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