Metaethical Agnosticism: Practical Reasons for Acting When Agnostic About the Existence of Moral Reasons

Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (1):59-75 (2020)
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There has been little discussion about how to act when uncertain about the existence of moral reasons in general. In this paper I will argue that despite being uncertain about the existence of moral reasons, someone can still have a practical reason to act in a particular way. This practical reason is morally relevant because it will have an impact on whether we’re making the correct moral decision. This practical reason will result from a principle of decision-making that can be used when someone is agnostic about the existence of moral reasons. The aims of this paper include explicitly beginning the discussion about this topic and advocating for a principle of moral decision-making that can be used despite being metaethically agnostic.
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Archival date: 2019-08-22
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