Non‐cognitivism about Metaphysical explanation

Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):1-20 (2022)
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Abstract

This article introduces a non‐cognitivist account of metaphysical explanation according to which the core function of judgements of the form ⌜x because y⌝ is not to state truth‐apt beliefs. Instead, their core function is to express attitudes of commitment to, and recommendation of the acceptance of certain norms governing interventional conduct at contexts.

Author Profiles

James Norton
University of Tasmania
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

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