Properties in a Contingentist's Domain

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):225-245 (2013)
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Abstract

This article attempts to make sense of property contingentism, the view that the metaphysical nature of properties is contingent. That is, it is contingent whether properties are universals or tropes or some other kind of entity. The article argues that even if one thinks that necessities are exhausted by conceptual truths and a posteriori necessities, the sort of methodology that can lead one to endorse contingentism in various domains in metaphysics does not give us good grounds to suppose that the nature of properties is contingent.

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Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

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