Reasonable foreseeability and blameless ignorance

Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1561-1581 (2017)
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This paper draws attention to a fundamental problem for a version of the tracing strategy defended by a number of theorists in the current literature (Rosen in Philos Perspect 18(1):295–313, 2004; Fischer and Tognazzini in Nous, 43(3):531–556, 2009). I argue that versions of the tracing strategy that require reasonable foreseeability are in tension with the view that blameless ignorance excuses. A stronger version of the tracing strategy is consistent with the view that blameless ignorance excuses and is therefore preferable for those tracing theorists who wish to continue maintaining that it does.
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