Presentism, eternalism, and the growing block

In Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-364 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper has three main sections. The first section provides a general characterisation of presentism, eternalism and growing blockism. It presents a pair of core, defining claims that jointly capture each of these three views. This makes clear the respects in which the different views agree, and the respects in which they disagree, about the nature of time. The second section takes these characterisations and considers whether we really do have three distinct views, or whether defenders of these views are somehow talking past one another when they claim to disagree. The third section looks at the key objections to each view and considers some of the replies that can be made to those objections. The paper concludes by offering some thoughts about how future research might help us resolve the debate between defenders of these three views.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MILTGB-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-08-26
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-09-01

Total views
3,401 ( #584 of 55,935 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
369 ( #946 of 55,935 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.