There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter

Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278 (2007)
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This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of second-order properties of the foundational property are relevant to property manifestation at different times.

Author Profiles

David Braddon-Mitchell
University of Sydney
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney


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