The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe

Metaphysica 17 (2) (2016)
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Abstract

This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.

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James (J.T.M.) Miller
Durham University

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