The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe

Metaphysica 17 (2) (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MILTNO-24
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Are All Primitives Created Equal?James Miller - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):273-292.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-05-17

Total downloads
43 ( #29,359 of 37,187 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #13,615 of 37,187 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.