Temporal phenomenology: phenomenological illusion versus cognitive error

Synthese 197 (2):751-771 (2020)
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Abstract
Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory.
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Archival date: 2018-02-09
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References found in this work BETA
Temporal Experience.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.

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Citations of this work BETA
Is Our Naïve Theory of Time Dynamical?Latham, Andrew James; Miller, Kristie & Norton, James
On Believing That Time Does Not Flow, but Thinking That It Seems To.Miller, Kristie; Holcombe, Alex & Latham, Andrew James
From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time.Gruber, Ronald P.; Montemayor, Carlos & Block, Richard A.

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