Deflating Truth: Pragmatism vs. Minimalism

The Monist 81 (3):407 - 425 (1998)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It seems that no philosopher these days wants a theory of truth which can be accused of being metaphysical. But even if we agree that grandiose metaphysics is to be spurned, even if we agree that our theory of truth should be a deflated one, the controversy does not die down. A variety of deflationist options present themselves. Some, with Richard Rorty, take the notion of truth to be so wedded to metaphysics that we are advised to drop it altogether. Others, with Paul Horwich, take the disquotational or equivalence schema—'p' is T if and only if p—to completely capture the content of the predicate 'is true'. And others argue that there is a conception of truth to be had which is non-metaphysical but which goes beyond the triviality expressed by the disquotational schema.
ISBN(s)
0026-9662
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MISDTP
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-09-15
Latest version: 2 (2019-09-15)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-09-30

Total views
169 ( #32,213 of 2,439,304 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #16,841 of 2,439,304 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.