Another Look at Mode Intentionalism

Erkenntnis:1-28 (forthcoming)
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A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience.
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Archival date: 2020-08-18
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