Abstract
Abstract: How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite
being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific
spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or
presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-
perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they
currently are – I call this the horizonality of visual experience. Existing accounts of these
horizonal references are unsatisfactory. In providing a satisfactory account, this paper argues
that the content and structure of the visual experience of complete three-dimensional objects is
as follows: the object is presented as being perceptible from yet-to-be-determined alternative
points of view. As part of the content of visual experience, this motivates non-propositional
attitudes of anticipation. Explicating this proposal is the central positive aim of this paper