The intentionality and intelligibility of moods

European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135 (2019)
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Abstract
This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality thesis). Section 3 argues some moods are experienced as rationally intelligible responses, and so epistemically appropriate, to the way ‘the world’ presents itself (the Mood-Intelligibility thesis). Finally, section 4 discusses the epistemology of moods.
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Archival date: 2018-11-17
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What We Owe to Each Other.Scanlon, Thomas M.
Mind and World.Price, Huw & McDowell, John

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2018-07-24

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