Discerning genuine and artificial sociality: a technomoral wisdom to live with chatbots

In Vincent C. Müller, Aliya R. Dewey, Leonard Dung & Guido Löhr (eds.), Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art. Berlin: SpringerNature (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Chatbots powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of engaging in what seems like natural conversations with humans. This raises the question of whether we should interact with these chatbots in a morally considerate manner. In this chapter, we examine how to answer this question from within the normative framework of virtue ethics. In the literature, two kinds of virtue ethics arguments, the moral cultivation and the moral character argument, have been advanced to argue that we should afford moral treatment to social robots. However, we propose a moral character argument against the view that we should afford moral treatment to LLM-based chatbots drawing on the notion of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom in this context consists in the skill to discern genuine and artificial sociality. Drawing on ideas from phenomenological philosophy, we argue that this involves the ability to distance oneself from direct social perception and the ability to widen one’s awareness over one’s apparently social interactions. We conclude by suggesting that this skill is a kind of technomoral wisdom required to live well with advanced, social AI systems.

Author Profiles

Katsunori Miyahara
Hokkaido University
Hayate Shimizu
Hokkaido University

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