An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science: A reply to Sterpetti

Axiomathes:1-13 (forthcoming)
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In this paper, I respond to Fabio Sterpetti’s (2018) attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA) and his New Induction over the History of Science (NIS) from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi (2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism.
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