An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure.

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

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