Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive?

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is ambiguous between two interpretations: CE as a normative epistemology of science and CE as a descriptive philosophy of science. When they present CE, constructive empiricists write as if CE is supposed to be more than a normative epistemology of science and that it is meant to be responsible to actual scientific practices. However, when they respond to objections, constructive empiricists fall back on a strictly normative interpretation of CE. This ambiguity seems to make CE immune to objections in a rather ad hoc fashion

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

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