Why the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging

The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MIZDTM
Upload history
First archival date: 2012-07-13
Latest version: 3 (2013-04-24)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-07-13

Total views
644 ( #6,690 of 54,578 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #16,943 of 54,578 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.