Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?

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In this paper, I argue that the method of cases (namely, the method of using intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories) is not a reliable method of generating evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. In other words, the method of cases is unlikely to generate accurate judgments more often than not. This is so because, if perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then using intuition pumps to elicit intuitive judgments is like using illusions to elicit perceptual judgments. In both cases, judgments are made under bad epistemic circumstances
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Archival date: 2013-09-01
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