Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological?

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):65-72 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Psychological Essentialism (PE), the view that essences are a heuristic or mental shortcut, is a better explanation for modal intuitions than Metaphysical Essentialism (ME), the view that objects have essences, or more precisely, that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. If this is correct, then the mere fact that we have modal intuitions is not a strong reason to believe that objects have essential properties.

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

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