Gettier Cases, Mental States, and Best Explanations: Another Reply to Atkins

Logos and Episteme 9 (1):75-90 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I have argued that Gettier cases are misleading because, even though they appear to be cases of knowledge failure, they are in fact cases of semantic failure. Atkins has responded to my original paper and I have replied to his response. He has then responded again to insist that he has the so-called “Gettier intuition.” But he now admits that intuitions are only defeasible, not conclusive, evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. I address the implications of Atkins’ admission in this paper and I again show that his attempts to revise Gettier’s original cases such that they do not involve semantic failures are unsuccessful.

Author's Profile

Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-27

Downloads
520 (#32,670)

6 months
144 (#24,520)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?