Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth Is Not Enough

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):415-419 (2017)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTThis discussion note aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of scientific progress. I argue against the semantic view of scientific progress, according to which scientific progress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view of scientific progress were correct, then scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case that scientists could make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories, it follows that the semantic view of scientific progress is incorrect.

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Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

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