Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aim of this discussion note is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of scientific progress. I argue against the semantic view of scientific progress, according to which scientific progress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view of scientific progress were true, then scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case that scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories, it follows that the semantic view of scientific progress is false.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MIZSPW
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-01-08
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-01-08

Total downloads
19 ( #33,619 of 36,522 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #17,144 of 36,522 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.