The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):461–466 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.

Author's Profile

Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-03

Downloads
787 (#19,292)

6 months
155 (#22,232)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?