Εικάζει η φιλοσοφία για εμπειρικά δεδομένα; Η γνωσιακή διαπερατότητα της αντίληψης [Does philosophy speculate about empirical facts? The cognitive penetrability of perception]

Noesis 6 (1):161-164 (2010)
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Abstract
Should we do speculative cognitive science? - In present day philosophy, I see a fashion that uses empirical facts (data) to support positions that are not philosophical but empirical in nature. The argumentative structure is classical philosophy, saying that ‘this has to be that way because …’ where the ‘this’ refers to some empirical state of affairs. This kind of philosophy speculates about empirical facts in areas where we do not yet know the facts – the arguments are a priori, supported by a posteriori data. This is precisely what the speculative philosophy of German Idealism was doing, e.g. in the works of Schelling or Hegel
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Archival date: 2015-11-02
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