Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 64 (1):10-56 (2019)
AbstractI argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē.
Archival historyFirst archival date: 2018-08-13
Latest version: 2 (2018-09-19)
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