Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion

Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364 (2020)
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Abstract

It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion.

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Jean Moritz Müller
University of Tübingen

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