Normativity in Internal Reason and External Reason Debate

Abstract

In Internal and external reasons, Bernard Williams, claims that there is nothing as an “external reason”. He first assumes that there might be two kinds of practical reasons, however, he rejects any possibility for such things as so called external reasons. he argues that all normative reasoning is either internal or non-explanatory. He also introduces a possible situation to have external reason, however he rejects this possibility, too. In Might there be external reasons? John McDowell, in response to Williams’ theory, tries to defend the idea that there are external reasons. He concentrates on the possible situation which are suggested by Williams and he accept some part of his conditions to have an external reason, however he doesn’t accept that a new motivational set should be necessarily came up throw rational deliberation. He proposes the case of conversion as a counterexample for Williams’s theory.

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