Generic one, arbitrary PRO, and the first person

Natural Language Semantics 14 (3):257–281 (2006)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The generic pronoun 'one' (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). The paper argues that generic 'one' involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity ‘as if’ to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (Simulation Theory).
Reprint years
2007
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MOLGOA
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-10-31

Total views
290 ( #11,069 of 41,495 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #8,214 of 41,495 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.