Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701 (2013)
Abstract
This paper argues that attitudinal objects, entities of the sort of John's judgment, John's thought, and John's claim, should play the role of propositions, as the cognitive products of cognitive acts, not the acts themselves.
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2014
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Structured Propositions as Types.Hanks, Peter W.
The Normativity of Content.Boghossian, Paul A.
Truth and Correct Belief.Gibbard, Allan
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Citations of this work BETA
An Object‐Based Truthmaker Semantics for Modals.Moltmann, Friederike
Predication and the Frege–Geach Problem.Reiland, Indrek
Speaks's Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem.Dixon, T. Scott & Gilmore, Cody
On Product‐Based Accounts of Propositional Attitudes.Felappi, Giulia
Three Views On Propositions: King, Soames and Speaks. [REVIEW]Radulescu, Alexandru
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2013-10-26
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2013-10-26
Total downloads
335 ( #7,427 of 37,192 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #25,134 of 37,192 )
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