Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper argues that attitudinal objects, entities of the sort of John's judgment, John's thought, and John's claim, should play the role of propositions, as the cognitive products of cognitive acts, not the acts themselves.

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Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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