Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs

In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come for free; rather they are strictly dependent on intentional acts that generally need to have a presence, in one way or another, in the semantic structure of the sentence.

Author's Profile

Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique


Added to PP

720 (#21,407)

6 months
132 (#28,540)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?